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Fig. 1. The six visualizations evaluated in our study, illustrating the classic mammography problem [21].
Abstract—People have difficulty understanding statistical information and are unaware of their wrong judgments, particularly in
Bayesian reasoning. Psychology studies suggest that the way Bayesian problems are represented can impact comprehension,
but few visual designs have been evaluated and only populations with a specific background have been involved. In this study, a
textual and six visual representations for three classic problems were compared using a diverse subject pool through crowdsourcing.
Visualizations included area-proportional Euler diagrams, glyph representations, and hybrid diagrams combining both. Our study
failed to replicate previous findings in that subjects’ accuracy was remarkably lower and visualizations exhibited no measurable
benefit. A second experiment confirmed that simply adding a visualization to a textual Bayesian problem is of little help, even when
the text refers to the visualization, but suggests that visualizations are more effective when the text is given without numerical values.
We discuss our findings and the need for more such experiments to be carried out on heterogeneous populations of non-experts.
Index Terms—Bayesian reasoning, base rate fallacy, probabilistic judgment, Euler diagrams, glyphs, crowdsourcing.
1 INTRODUCTION
Both laymen and professionals have difficulty making inferences and
decisions based on statistical and probabilistic data [18, 26, 32]. This
can have severe consequences in many domains.
Physicians need to diagnose diseases based on the outcome of un-
reliable medical tests. Patients need to decide whether they should un-
dertake heavy medical treatment. Wrong judgments are common and
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often result in overdiagnosis [55], e.g., up to two thirds of breast can-
cers detected by mammography can be overdiagnosed [58]. In other
cases, patients with a positive HIV test result attempted or committed
suicide before further tests turned out negative [13, 25, 50]. In this
domain, a crucial piece of information for effective decision making is
the probability that a patient has a disease given that a test is positive.
In legal trials, juries have to convict or acquit defendents based on
unreliable evidence and here too, wrong judgments abound [36]. A
respected professor and advisor to defense lawyers claimed on U.S.
television that since only 0.1% of wife batterers murder their wives,
evidence of battering should be ignored in murder trials [29]. This
reasoning is however fallacious, since the only important information
is the probability that a husband was the murderer given that he bat-
tered his wife and she was killed.
These two scenarios involve Bayesian inference, which is known to
be counterintuitive and subject to fallacious reasoning. As an illustra-
tion, consider the following classic problem [21]:
The probability that a woman at age 40 has breast cancer
is 1%. According to the literature, the probability that the
disease is detected by a mammography is 80%. The prob-
ability that the test misdetects the disease although the pa-
tient does not have it is 9.6%.
If a woman at age 40 is tested as positive, what is the prob-
ability that she indeed has breast cancer?
Out of 100 doctors, 95 estimated this probability to be between 70%
and 80%, while the correct probability is only 7.8% [21]. The prob-
ability is low because the prevalence of the disease in the population,
i.e., the base rate, is low. When making Baysian inference, this infor-
mation is often ignored [27, 32], thus leading to the base rate fallacy
[4, 5]. Using natural frequencies1 instead of probabilities reduces the
fallacy [18, 27, 31]. However, it is still difficult to comprehend how
the different numerical quantities relate to each other2.
Previously proposed solutions involve the use of heuristics [34] and
theories of mental models [33]. Others use visual representations. A
study confirms that when Bayes’ theorem is introduced to students
through visualizations, students learn faster and report higher tempo-
ral stability than without a visualization [48]. However, prior training
is not always possible. A few studies were conducted to assess the
immediate benefits of visualizations, but it is still unclear which is the
most effective representation for Bayesian reasoning. Moreover, stud-
ies have been carried out on populations with a specific background
(usually highly-focused university students), making it difficult to gen-
eralize their findings to a more diverse population of laypeople of var-
ious backgrounds and ages.
We present the first study that tests the effectiveness of six different
visualizations (i.e., Euler diagrams, glyph representations, and combi-
nations of the two) on a large, diverse group of participants through
crowdsourcing. Two new textual problem formats, specially designed
to be used with visualizations, are also proposed and evaluated.
We first discuss current visualizations for Bayesian reasoning (Sec-
tion 2). Then, we introduce the rationale of our study design (Section
3) and we report our two experiments together with our findings and
their implications (Sections 4 and 5). Finally, we summarize our work
and contributions (Section 6).
2 VISUALIZATIONS FOR BAYESIAN REASONING
Several visual representations have been considered for Bayesian
problems, including trees [48], “beam cut” pictorial analogs [27], con-
tingency tables [15, 16], signal detection curves [15, 16], detection
bars [15, 16], Bayesian boxes [10], and bar-grain boxes [10]. Some of
them, such as signal detection curves, are difficult to understand and
require subject training prior to the experiment [15, 16].
Two straightforward and popular visualizations in research are Eu-
ler diagrams and frequency grids. Studies suggest that Euler diagrams
can clarify the nested-set relations (i.e., how the different pieces of nu-
merical data relate) of Bayesian problems [49], while frequency grids
are believed to facilitate logical reasoning [8, 18]. Our work focuses
on these two types of visualizations and combinations of both.
2.1 Euler Diagrams
Sloman et al. [49] argued that Euler diagrams as in Figure 1-V1 are
effective in conveying the nested-set relations of Bayesian problems
(48% out of 25 participants gave a correct answer with Euler diagrams
and text vs. 20% out of 25 with text alone - both using probabilities).
However, expliciting nested-set relations in the text yielded similar
benefits. Later, Brase [8] found no improvement with Euler diagrams
(34.7% success out of 98 with Euler diagrams, 35.4% out of 96 with
text alone - both using natural frequencies). Yet, Euler diagrams have
been shown to clarify nested-set relations in problems involving in-
ductive [57] and deductive [6] reasoning.
1Using natural frequencies would mean stating “10 out of every 1,000
women” instead of giving a 1% probability. This frequency format is said to be
natural as the denominator corresponds to the number of actual observations.
2In our example, 1% is the base rate, 80% is the hit rate, and 9.6% is the
false alarm rate.
Studies in psychology tend to ignore Euler diagram design issues.
For example, in both Sloman et al.’s and Brase’s studies, Euler dia-
grams were not exactly area-proportional, meaning that the area of
the regions was not proportional to the quantities they were meant to
visualize and, this could have possibly made the diagrams misleading.
In contrast, Euler diagram design has been discussed extensively in
computer science and, various automatic generation algorithms have
been developed (e.g., [17, 38, 43, 44, 56]). However, apart from a few
exceptions [7, 43, 45], few user studies have been conducted in com-
puter science and, none of them focused on a particular application
area, such as Bayesian problem solving. As far as we know, our work
is the first at the intersection of the two disciplines.
2.2 Frequency Grids
Cosmides and Tooby [18] argued that representations with discrete,
countable objects like frequency grids, as in Figure 1-V3, facilitate
logical reasoning, but found no improvement over text alone (76%
success among 75 participants with frequency grid, 76% out of 50
with text alone using natural frequencies). They believed that visu-
alizations were ignored and found that guiding subjects into actively
drawing their own frequency grids resulted in a notably improved suc-
cess rate of 92% out of 25. Similarly, after training, Sedlmeier and
Gigerenzer [48] observed a success rate of 75% then 100% five weeks
later among 14 subjects who drew frequency grids, compared to 60%
then 20% (as before training) in 20 subjects applying Bayes’ theorem.
Yet, later, Brase [8] reported no improvement between passive and
actively drawn grids (49% out of 49 for active, 48.4% out of 95 for
passive). Cole and Davidson [16] agree that subjects become highly
accurate and fast when trained in using frequency grids compared to
text alone, but found no significant difference in errors between fre-
quency grids and other visualizations.
Studies in frequency grid design for risk communication suggest
that visualizations made up of two grids are perceived faster [42] and
those showing just the section of interest facilitate reasoning for low
probabilities [20]. For Bayesian reasoning, Brase [8] compared fre-
quency grids with regular and random layouts, but found no difference
in success rate (47.6% out of 42 subjects for both).
2.3 Hybrid Diagrams
Euler diagrams can convey critical information on the nested-set rela-
tions of Bayesian problems [28, 49], while representations with dis-
crete objects (e.g., glyphs) can facilitate logical reasoning [18]. Thus,
combining the two approaches by embedding glyphs in Euler dia-
grams, as in Figure 1-V4, V5 and V6, would seem beneficial.
We only know of one study, that by Brase [8], which evaluated hy-
brid diagrams as in Figure 1-V4 but using an Euler diagram as in Fig-
ure 1-V1. Results suggest that such diagrams do not increase success
rates compared to standard Euler diagrams or frequency grids (41.7%
out of 108 for hybrid, 48.4% out of 95 for frequency grid, 34.7% out
of 98 for Euler diagram, 35.4% out of 96 for text alone). Also, when
subjects were instructed to draw their visualization as in [18], hybrid
diagrams were even less effective (28% out of 50 for hybrid, 49% out
of 49 for frequency grid, 30% out of 50 for Euler diagram).
However, the visualization designs used in Brase’s study have a
number of issues: i) the hybrid diagram was area-proportional whereas
the pure Euler diagram was not, introducing a possibility of experi-
mental confound; ii) the number of glyphs in the hybrid diagram was
inconsistent with the numerical data (in the experiment comparing the
hybrid with the standard frequency diagram); iii) the hybrid diagram
and the frequency diagram used different glyph shapes (dots vs. an-
thropomorphic), introducing another possibility of confound.
In addition, like most other studies, Brase’s study involved a pop-
ulation of university students who had to participate in the study as
part of their psychology course requirement. Also, only one medical
diagnosis problem was evaluated, making it difficult to generalize the
findings to other problems. In the following section, we explain how
we address most of these limitations.
3 STUDY DESIGN RATIONALE
In this section, we motivate and justify our study design, including the
use of crowdsourcing, our different visualization designs, our choices
of Bayesian problems, and our performance measures.
3.1 Crowdsourcing
As mentioned before, most studies on Bayesian reasoning employed
populations with a specific background, often students [8, 27, 49],
which poses problems in terms of generalizability. For example, stu-
dents are typically 20 years old, while human capabilities to process
information decline with age, with the best performance being in early
twenties [47]. Another issue is ecological validity, since probabilistic
reasoning in the real world is different from a university setting where
students are trained to remain focused and make the best use of their
cognitive resources in order to solve a problem given by a professor.
For these reasons, we considered crowdsourcing and we used
MTurk [12, 40] as a technology to automatically outsource simple
tasks to a network of Internet users. The tasks posted by requesters are
called HITs (Human Intelligence Tasks) and are completed by anony-
mous workers who get a monetary reward, if successful. Although
crowdsourcing platforms have not been initially designed for conduct-
ing experiments, their use in research became popular [12], including
in information visualization [30]. The demographics of workers is
now well-understood [46] and a methodology is being developed for
designing effective experiments and addressing concerns such as sci-
entific control [30, 40].
Although crowdsourced experiments are subject to many of the
same problems as laboratory experiments, they capture some inter-
esting aspects of real-world problem solving. First, they capture a
large and diverse population with different backgrounds, levels of ed-
ucation and occupations, age groups and gender [46]. Furthermore,
workers typically try to complete as many HITs as possible (most of-
ten for personal satisfaction), while a rating system provides them with
incentives for being accurate [40]. Since workers typically complete
several HITs in sequence, they cannot focus on a single task as much
as participants to a laboratory experiment. We believe this better cap-
tures many situations when decisions have to be made accurately and
rapidly. In addition, due to the informal setup, workers might be less
subject to experimental biases such as demand characteristics [39].
Finally, setting up an experiment on a crowdsourcing platform can
be initially costly, but the time and effort for running subjects is much
lower than in laboratory experiments. With the notable exception of
Brase’s study [8] that involved 412 undergraduates students, previous
studies on Bayesian reasoning typically involved about 50 participants
[27, 49]. Therefore, small effects cannot be detected and results have
been rarely reported on two conditions being similar. Crowdsourcing
gives access to more statistical power and makes it easier to test mul-
tiple, diverse hypotheses such as those involving equivalence.
3.2 Visualization Designs
Previous studies examined whether visualizations can facilitate
Bayesian reasoning, but only one or a few visualizations were com-
pared at a time. In addition, the choices made in terms of visualiza-
tion design were rarely discussed and often inconsistent. Overall, this
makes it hard to interpret and compare findings across studies.
To address this, we propose a set of visualization designs (V1-
V6) that involve Euler-based representations, glyph-based represen-
tations, and combinations of the two. Consistent with the tradition
of HCI and infovis research, our goal is to start paving the design
space based on clear design rationales, while keeping unimportant de-
sign details as consistent as possible in order to better tease out the
effects of important design features. Novel algorithms (not discussed
in this article) were developed to automatically generate all of these
visualizations for any Bayesian problem. The software is available at
http://www.eulerdiagrams.org/eulerGlyphs. Figure 1
shows the visualizations generated for the classic mammography prob-
lem [21].
In the following sections, area-proportional will be denoted as AP.
V1: AP Euler Diagram with a 1-Set Population
Similar to the Euler diagrams proposed by Brase [8] and Sloman et
al. [49], the entire population in V1 is represented as one set that is
shown as a green circle in Figure 1-V1. The interior of the black circle
is divided in two: the red area corresponds to the hit rate, while the
remaining area corresponds to the false alarm rate. All the curves and
the intersecting regions are exactly area-proportional to the values in
the problem. Thus, the ratio between the hit rate area and the black
circle area is the answer to the Bayesian problem.
V1 is the only diagram representing the entire population and thus,
its design unavoidably differs in several respects. The other diagrams
represent the entire population as two regions shaded in red and blue.
To reduce the differences, we initially shaded the region inside the en-
tire population circle and outside the red circle of V1 in blue. However,
an early pilot study revealed that this could be misleading as subjects
assumed that the red circle formed part of the blue region (the blue re-
gion is the entire population minus the red circle). After trying several
unsuccessful variants, we opted to display the entire population circle
as an outline in a color different from red and blue, thus green.
V2: AP Euler Diagram with a 2-Set Population
V2 is a variant of V1 initially proposed (but not evaluated) by Kellen
et al. [35], where the entire population is split up into two sets (the red
and blue circles in Figure 1-V2). The complementarity of the two pop-
ulation sets is enhanced using disjoint circles and contrasting colors.
Since the third set represents a different concept, a different shape (an
ellipse) is used and only its outline is displayed. This makes the third
set distinguishable from the other two population sets, consistent with
the Gestalt principle of good continuation [37] and thus, easy to per-
ceive. We anticipated that compared to V1, this design would clarify
the nested-set relationships and facilitate Bayesian reasoning.
The regions in V2 are exactly area-proportional to the values in the
problem with the exception of two white regions which, as illustrated
in Figure 1, are irrelevant to the problem. These extra regions can
be eliminated by replacing the two population circles with rectangles.
However, the diagram would be less familiar to users and likely more
difficult to read due to a lack of good continuation. As shown in V4,
V5 and V6, this issue is mitigated by having all regions white and
overlaid by a number of colored glyphs representing the region’s value.
Regions with no glyphs look empty and irrelevant to the problem.
V3: Frequency Grid
V3 maps circular glyphs to different sets in the Bayesian problem,
with as many glyphs as members of the population. The design is rep-
resentative of typical designs in the literature on risk communication,
including the horizontal ruler provided to facilitate cardinality estima-
tion. The same color coding scheme (solid and outline colors) as V2
is used to convey set membership of glyphs.
Glyphs of different shapes have been used before, including simple
geometrical shapes [24] and icons such as anthropomorphic figures
[2, 8, 9]. Although icons are often thought to provide benefits, a study
reports no significant improvement over simple shapes for such visu-
alizations [51]. In addition, icons are problem-dependent (not all pop-
ulations represent people) and can make diagrams cluttered and hard
to read [24, 51]. Therefore, we opted for circles. Studies on hybrid
visualizations have also employed circles or squares so far [8, 35].
Different layouts have been proposed in the literature. Sometimes,
glyphs are laid out horizontally [9], vertically [42] or randomly [8].
A study [42] suggests that horizontal grids are perceived faster. Brase
[8] argues that sequential and random placement are both effective, but
others [2] suggest that randomness increases subject’s uncertainty as
proportions in the diagram are harder to estimate, differences are less
intuitive, and larger proportions are perceptually overestimated. We
therefore used a sequential layout, but placed glyphs vertically using
an ordering for the sets that matches the layout of the regions in V2.
For the grid dimensions, we used aspect ratios that are typical in the
literature: a 25×40 grid (for problems with a population of 1000) and
a 10×10 grid (for problems with a population of 100). Since glyphs
are difficult to label in-place, a separate legend was provided.
V4: AP Euler Diagram + Randomly Positioned Glyphs
V4 consists of the area-proportional Euler diagram V2 with glyphs
embedded in corresponding regions using an iterative random place-
ment algorithm without packing. It is similar to the visualization stud-
ied in [8] except that the Euler diagram is exactly area-proportional
and the numbers of glyphs match the values in the problem. Thus,
glyph density is constant across regions. For this design, as well as
hybrids V5 and V6, the size and shape of the glyphs is consistent with
V3 but due to their layout, no ruler can be shown. Both a legend (for
glyphs) and in-place labels (for Euler curves) are provided.
V5: Not AP Euler Diagram + Uniformly Positioned Glyphs
This hybrid visualization is similar to V4 but employs a regular grid
layout with the same glyph spacing as in V3. Automatically drawing
these diagrams is more difficult than with other hybrids, as the small-
est curves that enclose the glyphs have to be drawn after glyphs are
positioned in the correct regions. Thus, the Euler diagram is more
compact but not area-proportional, although it is often close to area-
proportional especially for regions with many glyphs.
V6: Not AP Euler Diagram + Frequency Grid Glyphs
Whereas V4 and V5 can be seen as “Euler-oriented” hybrid diagrams
where glyphs appear to have been added to the regions of an Euler dia-
gram (V2), V6 is a “Frequency grid - oriented” hybrid diagram where
Euler curves appear to have been added to a frequency grid (V3). No
attempt was made to ensure the Euler curves are area-proportional.
Brases’s study [8] involves a similar representation, but uses rectangu-
lar Euler curves producing more compact diagrams with greater em-
phasis on the frequency grid representation.
3.3 Bayesian Problems
Most previous studies involved a unique Bayesian problem. This could
be problematic due to the diverse interests, background, and experi-
ence of participants [9, 19]. Studying more than one problem can help
level out possible adherence and attachment effects and facilitate the
generalization of the experiment findings. A classic study [27] evalu-
ated 15 problems, each involving a different scenario. Crowdsourcing
experiments have to be short and thus, we chose three problems.
We wanted problems that have been tested in previous studies, are
diverse in terms of scenario, and whose base rate, hit rate and false
alarm rate are different enough. We opted for a natural frequency for-
mat, since it has been shown to work better than probabilities [27, 32].
For these reasons, we chose the following problems (see Table 1): the
mammography problem [21], Mam; the cab problem [3], Cab; and the
choosing a course in economics problem [1], Eco.
3.4 Measures of Performance
Although most previous studies focus on maximizing and reporting the
proportion of correct answers, this dichotomous approach has some
limits. First, a percentage of exact answers (say, 75%) says nothing
about how far off the remaining 25% are. Second, it is rare that the
outcome of a decision depends on a probability estimation being per-
fectly exact or not (e.g., making an estimation of 0.001 instead of the
correct 0.0012), whereas an estimate of 0.4 versus 0.001 will often
produce radically different outcomes. Finally, helping people com-
pute an exact answer might be useful in some situations (e.g., teaching
probabilities), but is of limited relevance to many real-life situations
where one has to make quick decisions and rarely has enough time
and attentional resources to sit down and grab a pen or a calculator.
We therefore chose to focus on accuracy, i.e., how far subjects are
from the actual answers. Since in the natural frequency format an-
swers are provided as a nominator and a denominator (i.e., v1 out of
v2), we start by computing the probability p = v1/v2. We believe this
is acceptable since ultimately, the answer is a probability (e.g., the
chances of having a cancer). We then compute a bias, which gives
the error together with the direction of the error. Although one could
use p− pe, with pe being the exact answer, subtracting probabilities
can lead to paradoxes. For example, if pe = 0.01, then p = 0.0000001
would be a more correct answer than p= 0.02. So we use log10(p/pe)
Table 1. The text for the three problems in experiment 1.
Mam 10 out of every 1,000 women at age forty who participate in routine screening have
breast cancer. 8 of every 10 women with breast cancer will get a positive mammog-
raphy. 95 out of every 990 women without breast cancer will also get a positive
mammography.
Here is a new representative sample of women at age forty who got a positive mam-
mography in routine screening. How many of these women do you expect to actually
have breast cancer?
Cab A cab was involved in a hit-and-run accident at night. Two cab companies, the Red
and the Blue, operate in the city. Of every 100 cabs in the city, 15 are Blue and 85
are Red. On the night of the accident, a witness identified the cab as Blue. The court
tested the reliability of the witness under the similar visibility conditions with Blue
and Red cabs. When the cabs were really Blue, the witness said they were Blue in
12 out of 15 tests. When the cabs were really Red, the witness said they were Blue
in 17 out of 85 tests.
What are the chances that the cab involved in the hit-and-run accident was Blue?
Eco In a small liberal arts college students take, as an elective, a general interest course
in economics or history. A recent analysis of enrollment figures showed that out of
every 1,000 students, 700 students took the general interest course in history, while
300 students took the course in economics. For 210 of the students out of the 300
who took the economics course, the decision on pursuing the economics course was
career oriented. For 350 of the students out of the 700 who took the history course,
the decision on pursuing the history course was career oriented.
Barbara T. was one of the students who took one of the two general interest courses.
Her decision on pursuing the course was career oriented. What are the chances that
she had taken the economics course?
instead. The log makes it easy to report and compare large estimation
errors. Thus, if pe = 0.01 and p = 0.001, then the bias will be −1 and
if p = 0.1 the bias will be 1.
We derive the error from the bias by computing its absolute value.
This assumes that a negative bias is as serious as a positive bias, which
is a reasonable assumption for problem-independent studies such as
our user study. Alternatively, this measure can be adapted to situa-
tions where an overestimation is more costly than an underestimation
or vice-versa, by pre-multiplying positive or negative biases with a
constant. To be able to compare our data with previous experiments,
we still report the occurrence of answers for which error = 0.
In addition to bias and error, we decided to measure the subjects
confidence in their answers. This is important because if a visualiza-
tion makes people very accurate but not confident at all, then it is of
limited use. Conversely, a visualization that makes people very con-
fident but plain wrong is harmful, more so than a visualization that
makes people less accurate but not overconfident.
Finally, we also decided to measure the time spent reading problems
and proving an answer. If workers devote very little time to problems
compared to, e.g., laboratory experiment participants, then it could
mean that they are not carrying out the task seriously enough. Con-
versely, if they devote too much time, then maybe crowdsourcing does
not capture quick real-world decision making situations at all.
3.5 Measures of Abilities
A certain level of numeracy ability is required for the understanding
and manipulation of natural frequencies [11] and other statistical in-
formation [9], while spatial abilities help to efficiently search and re-
trieve information. In addition, visualizations might not be helpful to
everyone due to different abilities [24] and, the most appropriate vi-
sualization could also depend on abilities. For example, Kellen et al.
[35] hypothesized that Euler diagrams can facilitate Bayesian reason-
ing for those with high spatial abilities, while frequency grids can aid
those with high numeracy.
Considering the diversity of MTurk workers, we decided to measure
the numeracy and spatial abilities of our participants. Numeracy was
measured using the 6-question objective numeracy test from Brown et
al. [9] due to the similarities of the subjects’ demographics and their
considerations that online subjects are highly educated. To this, we
added part 2 of the Subjective Numeracy Scale (SNS) [23]. Spatial
abilities were measured using part 1 of the Paper Folding Test (VZ-2)
[22]. These are all paper-based tests that we faithfully reimplemented
in HTML and JavaScript, including the 3-minute limit for VZ-2.
4 EXPERIMENT 1: COMPARISON OF VISUALIZATIONS
The purpose of this first experiment was to test the six different vi-
sualizations discussed in Section 3.2 and compare them with text
alone. We hypothesized that our visualizations will help subjects solve
Bayesian problems. Most of our visualizations were based on a less
common Euler diagram representation for Bayesian problems because
we anticipated that, by representing the population as two disjoint sets,
the reader will be less likely to disregard the base rate. Following pre-
vious theories [35], we also hypothesized that subjects with low spatial
abilities would benefit from visualizations having discrete and count-
able objects, while those with high spatial abilities will benefit mostly
from spatial representations such as Euler diagrams.
4.1 Design
As experimental conditions, we had three Bayesian problems and
seven visualization types including text alone (V0) and the visualiza-
tions in Section 3.2 (V1-V6). Thus, our independent variables were:
• Bayesian problem: PROBLEM ∈ {Mam, Cab, Eco};
• Visualization type: VIS ∈ {V0, V1, V2, V3, V4, V5, V6}.
Our dependent variables were:
• BIAS, the difference between the subject’s answer and the exact
answer, computed as a log ratio;
• ERROR, the absolute value of BIAS;
• EX ∈ {0,1}, whether the answer is exact;
• TIME, the time taken to solve the problem;
• CONF ∈ [1 . .5], the subject’s confidence in his/her answer.
Our covariates were:
• NUM ∈ [0 . .30], the subject’s score in the numeracy test;
• SPAT ∈ [0 . .10], the subject’s score in the paper folding task.
We used a mixed-design approach where each participant was pre-
sented the three problems, each accompanied by the same visualiza-
tion type. The use of a between-subjects design for the visualiza-
tion factor is consistent with previous studies [8, 18, 49] and prevents
asymmetric skill transfer effects [41]. To counterbalance any possi-
ble learning effect across problems, all the six possible orderings of
the three problems were used. We had 24 participants per visualiza-
tion and thus, each of the six problem orderings had one of the seven
visualization types and was carried out by four different participants.
4.2 Participants
The participants consisted of 168 crowdsource workers from MTurk.
At the end of the HIT, they were asked demographics questions whose
answers are summarized in Table 2. These demographics are not fully
consistent with some other previous studies on MTurk workers. For
instance, the majority of our workers were males (59% in our exper-
iment vs. 25% [40] and 48% [46] in MTurk workers studies). Also,
considering education and occupation in Table 2, our participants were
considerably educated. This could be due to a self-selection bias (re-
fer to the HIT title and details in the next section). Five (3%) reported
having color blindness, but all of our visualizations used a color-blind
friendly palette from ColorBrewer (http://colorbrewer.org).
4.3 Procedure
We first conducted a pilot study with subjects in France and UK
(N = 14, 2 per visualization type) by hosting the experiment form on
a private web page. For the final experiment, HITs were uploaded on
MTurk. Once all the required HITs were completed, the workers were
granted a qualification to carry out a follow-up questionnaire.
4.3.1 Task
Participants had to fill a form out in their own Web browser. The form
was split up into 10 pages and took around 25 minutes to complete.
Participants could not review previous pages and could not proceed
to the next page without completing all the questions. The first page
instructed them to remain focused and not to stop unless all the pages
Table 2. The demographics of the 168 participants.
Gender Female: 41%, Male: 59%
Age Median: 29, Mean: 32, Range: [18,64]
Residence USA: 47%, India: 40%, Other: 13%
Education Bachelor’s Degree: 45%, Some College, No Degree: 22%,
Master’s Degree: 15%, Other: 18%
Occupation Professionals, Managers: 38%, Labourers, Service: 30%,
Students: 18%, Unemployed, Retired, House-Makers: 15%
Color-blind None: 163, Red-green: 4, Other: 1
Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding
were completed. The three problems were then presented on separate
pages either using text alone (V0) or text followed by a visualization
(V1-V6). Workers had to enter two values, v1 out of v2, and had
to indicate their confidence on a 5-point Likert scale. The next page
contained three catch questions in relation to the three previous prob-
lems (e.g., “The women were screened for skin cancer - yes / no”).
This was followed by four pages containing the objective numeracy
test, the subjective numeracy test, and the paper folding test (see Sec-
tion 3.5). The final page was a brief questionnaire asking workers
demographics-related information and the methods or tools (e.g., pen
and paper, calculator) they used to solve the problems. The time spent
on each page was recorded.
4.3.2 MTurk Design
Since standard MTurk markup does not support custom JavaScript,
we used the “external HIT” hosting method. Each of the 42 unique
combinations of problem orderings and visualization types (6 problem
orderings × 7 visualization types) was a unique HIT on MTurk and
four copies of each (four assignments) were uploaded. The title of the
HIT was “Scientific Study on Visualizations and Judgment”. Studies
such as [40] suggest a reward based on $1.66 per hour. Thus, we opted
for a reward of $1 for our 25-minute HITs. A system qualification was
used to allow only workers with a HIT approval rate of at least 95% to
participate. After completion, multiple HITs carried out by the same
worker were rejected (i.e., not paid, as stated on our instruction page)
and discarded from analysis. HITs with a wrong answer to one or more
of the catch questions were also rejected and discarded from analysis.
HITs were reposted until 168 = 24×7 valid HITs were obtained.
4.4 Hypotheses
Our hypotheses were:
• H1a. VIS conditions V1-V6 yield lower ERROR than V0,
• H1b. Condition V2 yields lower ERROR than condition V1,
• H1c. The improvements observed for V3-V6 over V0 will be the
highest for subjects having low scores in the paper folding task
(low SPAT),
• H1d. The improvements observed for V2 and V4-V6 over V0
will be the highest for subjects with high SPAT.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Biases in Answers
We start with an analysis of BIAS, which captures the discrepancy
between the subjects’ answers to the problems and the exact answers.
Figure 2 shows the distributions of BIAS per PROBLEM and VIS for
the 24 subjects assigned to each VIS condition.
From Figure 2, it can be observed that i) consistent with previous
findings [27], answers are not normally distributed, certain wrong an-
swers being much more common than others; ii) the distributions dif-
fer across PROBLEMs but seem very similar across VIS conditions. In
particular, there is no obvious sign of V1-V6 outperforming V0.
The distributions are also well-balanced around zero, suggesting no
clear general tendency to underestimate or overestimate probabilities.
Median biases per PROBLEM × VIS were overall close to zero (for all
21 values of median biases M = 0.06, SD = 0.13), as well as mean
biases (M = 0.003, SD = 0.14). A grand mean of 0.003 is remarkably
small (it would correspond to a probability estimate of, e.g., 0.1007
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Fig. 2. Distributions of bias in answers per Bayesian problem and visu-
alization condition (N = 24 each). Black bars are exact answers. A bias
of −1 means an answer 10× lower and a bias of 1 means 10× higher.
4.5.2 Exact Answers and Errors
Exact answers are those for which EX = 1 or equivalently, BIAS =
0. They are shown in Figure 2 as black bars. There were 12% ex-
act answers overall, with 15% exact answers for Mam, 5% for Cab
and 15% for Eco. V0 yielded 6% exact answers, whereas V1-V6
yielded 14%,11%,11%,21%,7% and 14% exact answers (N = 24
each). These percentages are much lower than in previous studies,
suggesting that the problem does not lie in a systematic bias (e.g., no
evidence for a base rate fallacy), but rather in poor individual accuracy.
A finer measure of accuracy is the ERROR metric, i.e., how far the
answers were to correct answers. The overall median ERROR was 0.27
(M = 0.38, SD= 0.39). A mean of 0.38 is fairly large and corresponds
to a probability estimate of, e.g., 0.24 or 0.04 instead of 0.1.
4.5.3 Effect of Visualization on Error
In the rest of this section, we average the errors for Mam, Cab and Eco
into a single ERROR measure. Box plots of ERROR per VIS are shown
in Figure 3. It can be seen that effect sizes are quite small (differences
in medians are much smaller than variances) and, a Kruskal-Wallis
rank sum test for non-normal distributions indeed reports no signifi-
cant difference between VIS conditions (H(6) = 4.1, p = 0.66). Thus,
our hypothesis H1b (V2 is more accurate than V1) is not confirmed.
Comparing text alone with all V1-V6 aggregated (N = 144) does
not yield any significant difference either (Kruskal-Wallis, H(1) = 1.6,
p = 0.21). Thus, our hypothesis H1a cannot be confirmed either.
4.5.4 Subject Abilities
The median score for numeracy NUM was 24 / 30 (M = 23.5, SD =
4.0), while that for spatial ability SPAT was 5 / 10 (M = 5.1, SD= 2.2).
More than half (55%) the subjects got a moderate to high score for
both tests, as defined by [9, 23]. Correlations between ERROR and
subject abilities were low (r = −0.08 for NUM and r = −0.07 for
SPAT), suggesting little influence of abilities on accuracy overall.
We conducted further analyses by splitting subjects into two groups:
SPAT≤ 5 and SPAT > 5. In both groups, mean errors were very similar
(M ∈ [0.36, 0.38]) for V0, glyph-based visualizations combined (V3-
V6) and Euler-based visualizations combined (V2 and V4-V6), with
no statistically significant difference. Thus, our hypotheses H1c and
H1d on effects of individual abilities are not confirmed.
4.5.5 Confidence in Answers
The median score for CONF was 3 on a 5-point Likert scale (M = 3.4,
SD = 1.1): subjects were typically “reasonably confident” in their an-
swers, with a trend towards high confidence. Correlation with ERROR
was low (r = −0.08). Medians for CONF averaged across problems
ranged from 3.0 to 3.7 depending on the VIS condition, with no statis-
tically significant difference (Kruskal-Wallis, H(6) = 5.8, p = 0.45).









Fig. 3. Answer errors for all three Bayesian problems combined per
visualization condition (N = 24 each).
4.5.6 Time Spent
The median completion time for reading and answering problems
(TIME) was 113 sec (M = 154 sec, SD= 130): subjects typically spent
about 2 min on each problem, which is about half the time spent by our
initial pilot subjects (researchers and students from our laboratories).
The correlation with ERROR was low (r = 0.02). The median TIME
for the first problem presented was 129 sec and went down to 106 sec
for the last one, suggesting a moderate learning effect.
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the model log(TIME) ∼ VIS
suggests that the total time spent on the three problems depends on the
VIS condition (F(6, 161) = 2.5, p < .05). Post-hoc pairwise compar-
isons with t-test and Bonferroni correction reveal a difference between
V1 and V2 and between V2 and V4 (p < .05). Median times were 168
sec for V1, 72 sec for V2 and 149 sec for V4. Thus, although subjects
were not more accurate with V2 than V1 (our initial hypothesis H1b),
they spent much less time (less than half) parsing V2.
4.6 Qualitative Feedback
When asked which tools or methods they used to get their answer,
8% of the participants specifically reported using Bayes’ theorem (not
mentioned in the question). Others used basic mathematics, carried
out mental calculations, estimated answers, or guessed. About 75%
reported using pen and paper or a calculator. Three subjects (2%)
commented that they did not know they could use any of these tools.
Three weeks after the experiment, all participants were invited to
complete a 2-minute follow-up questionnaire for $0.20 on MTurk.
Fifty-three participants out of the 168 (32%) responded. The seven vi-
sualization types for the Cab problem were shown and the participants
had to either identify the type they had seen during the experiment or
state that they do not remember at all. They then had to indicate on a
5-point Likert scale how much they looked at the provided visualiza-
tions, how much they used them to solve the corresponding problems,
and explain why. This helped us understand whether the participants
referred to the visualizations and whether they found them helpful.
A large majority (89%) of the 53 respondents reported using the
visualizations to solve the problem (scales 3-‘somehow used them’
up to 5-‘used them a lot’ on a 5-point Likert scale). However, only
47% remembered the correct visualization type. This was likely due
to the relatively long time period between the experiment and the ques-
tionnaire and, due to the similarities among some visualization types.
Among those who correctly remembered the visualization type, 92%
reported using the visualization to solve the problem.
Most of the 53 respondents (79%) commented that the diagrams
helped them visualize the problem (e.g., Table 3a), of which 6 (11%)
specifically indicated that it helped them understand the relationships
between the sets and the given values (e.g., Table 3b). Four subjects
(8%) who had text alone (V0) wished they had diagrams (e.g., Table
3c). Five (9%) reported comparing the color and size of the sets and
the overlapping regions, while 3 (6%) reported counting the glyphs.
Other positive comments included: the diagrams helped to understand
the statistics (e.g., Table 3d), clarified the problem (e.g., Table 3e),
helped to identify the regions for the final answer (e.g., Table 3f).
Table 3. Some participant comments in the follow-up questionnaire.
a It can be explained only if there is a diagram relevant to the incident or question.
b Diagrams show relationships between different sets. Easy to understand links.
c I had trouble visualizing the data on my own. Diagrams would have been essential.
d Diagrams gave me a visual clue to understand problem better and to find answer.
e It would have been helpful to picture the scene.
f Saw the diagram and figured out the regions for the answer.
g I compared the size of the circles and the overlapping regions, but just looking at
the diagram was not enough.
h Used diagrams to get answer but did not fully understand them so it was difficult.
i When thinking about populations, sample sizes and similar statistical problems,
an intuitive grasp of problem comes quicker and easier through diagrams than
mere words. I would not, however, have slavishly followed diagrams since I would
still have to determine if the diagram was accurate and represented the problem
as stated.
j The text was enough, they didn’t simplify anything, just complicated it more.
k The text was more than sufficient.
However, 7 participants (13%) commented that the diagrams were
not enough to answer the question (e.g., Table 3g). Three (6%) said
that they did not fully understand the diagram (e.g., Table 3h), while
one reported a lack of familiarity with the visualization. Six (11%)
used the diagrams just to verify their answer, 4 (8%) stated that they
did not trust the diagrams because in some experiments they are drawn
incorrectly on purpose (e.g., Table 3i), while 3 (6%) claimed that hav-
ing two representations was confusing and since the actual values were
in the text, they ignored the visualization (e.g., Table 3j). Three (6%)
stated that the diagrams were useless (e.g., Table 3k).
4.7 Discussion
Though we used the best known textual representation (natural fre-
quencies) [27] and the same text and text+visualization format as in
previous studies, we failed to replicate previous findings as our sub-
jects’ accuracy was remarkably lower. For instance, considering V0
(text and no visualization), previous studies reported 35% [8], 46%
[27], 51% [49] and 72% [18] exact answers with the natural frequency
format, which are considerably higher than the 6% we obtained.
Yet, everything seems to suggest that our participants completed the
tasks seriously. Only workers with a high HIT accept rate (95%) could
participate and, since such a selection criteria is common practice,
they have incentives to maintain a high rate. In addition, they were
overall successful at the tests, the paper folding test being particularly
attention-demanding. Finally, they often reported being confident in
their answers and wrote a number of positive comments.
Of much concern is the fact that nearly all of our subjects were at
least reasonably confident in their answer. In a real world situation,
fallacious reasoning combined with overconfidence can easily lead to
wrong decisions, with potentially harmful consequences (e.g., choos-
ing whether to undertake chemotherapy after being diagnosed with
cancer). Since we found that bias was close to zero overall, bad judg-
ments could go either way.
We believe that far from invalidating the choice of the crowdsourc-
ing method, these poor results motivate the need for more studies of
this sort. It is important that techniques that aid probabilistic reason-
ing and decision making can benefit untrained people with different
backgrounds and age ranges and, remain effective in situations where
little time and attention are available.
In addition to a low accuracy overall, none of the visualizations we
tested seemed to help. Although there is surely an effect [14], Fig-
ure 3 suggests that effects on our metrics of interest (see Section 3.4)
are small. This contrasts with conclusions drawn from studies on pro-
portions of correct answers [8]. Girotto and Gonzalez go as far as
arguing that with appropriate use of visualizations, anyone (including
‘naive’ subjects) could solve Bayesian problems [28]. However, our
results are also consistent with previous studies finding no significant
improvement with visualizations over text alone [18].
Although Cosmides and Tooby suggest that passive visualizations
are ignored when solving Bayesian problems [18], 89% of our 53 par-
ticipants who completed the follow-up questionnaire confirmed that
they at least “somehow” used the diagram. Most of them reported
finding the diagram very useful and commented that they generally
like being given diagrams to solve problems. So it seems that subjects
tended to overestimate the degree to which diagrams are helpful.
It is worth noting that despite positive comments overall, various
participants commented that they did not fully understand the diagram,
that having two representations was confusing, that they ignored it and
that the information provided in the text was sufficient. A few others
doubted the credibility of the diagram and chose to trust the text.
Several solutions have already been suggested. Teaching Bayesian
reasoning is one of them. It can be extremely effective [48] but again,
we chose to focus on techniques that can be used without prior train-
ing or background. Another well known approach is the use of active
rather than passive visualizations [18] (but see also [8]). Having peo-
ple draw their own visualization can be effective, but it is not practi-
cal in many situations, including in scientific press, informative pam-
phlets, or in broadcasted visual adverts [26]. For similar reasons, static
visualizations should probably be considered before interactive ones.
Since the answer to the Bayesian problem is in the diagram itself, it
should be possible to increase the chances that people find it, either by
i) helping them make the link between the text and the diagram [28];
ii) encouraging them to search for the solution in the diagram; and iii)
forcing them to search for the solution in the diagram.
We propose two alternative presentation techniques that only in-
volve moderate modifications to the text: a) adding short instructions
in the text that refer to the diagram (thereby supporting i and possibly
ii), b) removing all numerical quantities from the text (supporting iii).
The last technique is based on the idea that a rough estimation can be
better than a plain wrong calculation and should further eliminate any
possible doubt that the visualization is not credible.
We conducted a second experiment in order to i) confirm that simply
adding a visualization to a Bayesian problem is of little help, and ii)
testing whether an improvement can be obtained by the above two
presentation techniques. In order to test i, we only included V0 and V4
and increased statistical power with larger sample sizes (from N = 24
to N = 120 each). V4 was the diagram with the lowest mean error
and combined both Euler diagrams and glyphs. To further simplify
the design, we only included the Mam problem. We chose it because
it is a classic problem which has been used in various studies [21, 27].
5 EXPERIMENT 2: ALTERNATIVE TEXT FORMATS
In this second experiment, we set ourselves to i) confirm with a larger
sample that simply adding a visualization to a Bayesian problem is of
little help, and ii) investigate some possible solutions.
Based on the data from our first experiment, we hypothesized that
simply appending a visualization to the textual information will yield
at best weak improvements (our data only shows non-significant dif-
ferences in mean ERRORs of about 0.1 points). We further hypothe-
sized that this issue could be addressed by providing instructions in
the text on how to parse the visualization. We also believed that the
numerical values provided in the text could encourage wrong calcu-
lations and discourage parsing the visualization, so we hypothesized
that not providing these values would also help.
5.1 Design
Our independent variable was presentation type PRES, with the fol-
lowing four conditions:
• V0: Textual form only, equivalent to the condition {PROBLEM =
Mam, VIS = V0} from the previous experiment;
• V4: Text with visualization, equivalent to the previous condition
{PROBLEM = Mam, VIS = V4};
• V4a: Like V4, but with references to the visualization in the text
(Table 4);
• V4b: Like V4, but with numbers removed from the text (Table 4).
We used a between-subjects design and our dependent variables
were BIAS, ERROR, EX, TIME and CONF as previously.
Table 4. Novel text formats for the Mam problem in experiment 2.
V4a 10 out of every 1,000 women at age forty who participate in routine screening have
breast cancer (compare the red dots in the diagram below with the total number of
dots). 8 of every 10 women with breast cancer will get a positive mammography
(compare the red dots that have a black border with the total number of red dots). 95
out of every 990 women without breast cancer will also get a positive mammography
(compare the blue dots that have a black border with the total number of blue dots).
V4b A small minority of women at age forty who participate in routine screening have
breast cancer. A large proportion of women with breast cancer will get a positive
mammography. A small proportion of women without breast cancer will also get a
positive mammography.
5.2 Participants
Our participants were 480 MTurk workers who never completed any
of our previous HITs. We thought the demographics should be similar
to the previous experiment (Section 4.2), so we did not include any
demographics questions.
5.3 Procedure
We conducted the experiment on MTurk as previously. The HITs were
shorter, including only the Mam problem and no abilities tests.
5.3.1 Task
The form was made up of four pages and took around five minutes to
complete. After the instruction page, the Mam problem was presented
using either V0, V4, V4a or V4b. The questions and the layout of
the pages were the same as before, except participants were told they
could optionally use any tool or method. The next page had a single
catch question. On the final page, participants were asked whether
they tried to compute an exact answer and had to indicate on a 5-point
Likert scale how much they used the diagram to solve the problem.
5.3.2 MTurk Design
We created four unique HITs, one for each presentation condition, and
120 assignments for each were uploaded on MTurk with a $0.40 re-
ward. The same system qualification was used as in Experiment 1.
Participants to Experiment 1 were blocked and duplicate HITs were
rejected as before. HITs of workers who selected the wrong answer
to the catch question were also rejected. In contrast to the previous
experiment, workers who submitted the HIT only once but had previ-
ously seen the problem (either because they gave up before submitting
or experienced technical issues) were identified through a question on
the last page asking the workers whether they already attempted to
load the HIT but failed to submit it. We clearly stated that this was not
going to affect our decision to accept or reject the HIT. In fact, HITs
from workers who replied “yes” or “unsure” (about 11%, not included




• H2a. Condition V4 does not lower the mean ERROR by more
than 0.1 points compared to V0,
• H2b. Condition V4a yields lower ERRORs than V4,
• H2c. Condition V4b yields lower ERRORs than V4.
5.5 Results
5.5.1 Bias
Figure 4 shows the distributions of BIAS for each PRES. These are
similar to those of the previous experiment, except for V4b which is
closer to normal. This time, as shown in Figure 5, not all the distribu-
tions were well-balanced around zero. The median biases were 0.015,
-0.59, -0.49 and 0.013 for V0, V4, V4a and V4b. The differences are
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Fig. 4. Distributions of biases in answers to the Mam problem (N = 120










Fig. 5. Biases in answers to the Mam problem per presentation type











Fig. 6. Answer errors to the Mam problem per presentation type (N = 120
each).
5.5.2 Accuracy
Exact answers for V0 and V4 were 3.3% and 5.0% (see black bars in
Figure 4) and lower than in the previous experiment (15% for Mam).
Median errors for V0 and V4 were both 0.8903 and equal to those of
the previous experiment. Mean errors were however larger (0.76 and
0.68 compared with 0.64 and 0.54 for the previous experiment). Thus,
it seems that subjects were overall less successful in this experiment.
That V4 yielded a lower mean error than V0 suggests that adding a
diagram might have helped, but the difference in means is consistent
with H2a (0.68 vs. 0.76 and same medians). Inconsistent with H2b
however, V4a yielded the same ratio of exact answers, the same me-
dian error and a similar mean error as V4, suggesting that referring to
the diagram in the text did not help. In contrast, although V4b rarely
yielded an exact answer3 (0.83%), it yielded a much lower median
error of 0.41 and a lower mean error of 0.53, consistent with H2c.
The differences between PRES types, shown in Figure 6, are statis-
tically significant (Kruskal-Wallis, H(3) = 21, p < .001). A multiple
comparison with V0 using Siegel and Castellan’s procedure reveals
that all visual presentation types are significantly better than text alone,
confirming our previous hypothesis H1a (R package kruskalmc, one-
tailed, p < .05). Using the same test with V4 as the control, the only
3A single subject out of 120 gave the exact answer. Later in the question-
naire, this subject commented, “I kept losing count, so I hit PrintScreen, and
pasted it into paint, and marked the ones I had counted.”
significant difference is with V4b, confirming our hypothesis H2c (re-
moving numbers helps) but not H2b (referring to the figure helps). Fi-
nally, a Wilcoxon test of equivalence for non-normal data confirms our
hypothesis H2a (R package etc.diff, margins = [−0.1,0.1], p < .05).
Hence, all visual presentations were better than text alone but im-
provements were small, except for V4b where improvements were
larger. The task involved in V4b was still error-prone, with proba-
bility estimations typically about 3 times lower or higher, but it clearly
improved over V0 for which typical estimates were 6 or 8 times lower
or higher (depending on whether we consider the average or the me-
dian error). In addition, V4b yielded no bias, whereas with other visual
presentations subjects tended to underestimate probabilities.
5.5.3 Confidence
Confidence scores were similar to before and very similar across
PRES, with a median of 3 (“reasonably confident”) and means between
3.28 and 3.36. Differences were not statistically significant (Kruskal-
Wallis, H(3) = 0.6, p = 0.89). As before, correlation with error was
low (r =−0.06).
5.5.4 Time
Completion times were similar to those of the previous experiment
and similar across all PRES conditions (ANOVA, F(3, 476) = 1.26,
p= 0.29). Medians ranged from 112 sec for V4b (M = 145,SD= 115)
to 132 sec for V4a (M = 163, SD = 108).
5.5.5 Strategies
Discarding “unsure” responses (9% overall), subjects who reported
having tried to get the exact answer were 68%, 72%, 63% and 50% for
V0, V4, V4a and V4b. This suggests that diagrams did not dissuade
subjects from trying to find the exact answer.
As for the degree to which subjects reported relying on the diagram,
the median answer to the 5-point Likert scale was 3 for V4 (M = 3.3,
SD = 1.5). Subjects who were assigned to V0 and later asked whether
they would have used the diagram gave a median answer of 4 (M= 3.6,
SD = 1.), suggesting that subjects tend to use diagrams less than they
would have predicted.
V4a was similar to V4, with a median answer of 3.5 (M = 3.4, SD=
1.3). In contrast, the median answer was 5 for V4b (M = 4.4, SD =
0.86). This indicates that, rather unsurprisingly, subjects relied on the
diagram much more when numbers were not provided.
5.6 Discussion
Our first experiment revealed that crowdsource workers were quite un-
successful at solving Bayesian problems. Our second experiment had
two objectives: i) confirm that simply adding a Euler/Glyph visual-
ization to a Bayesian problem is not a viable solution (we increased
sample size from N = 24 to N = 120 to get more statistical power) and
ii) start exploring possible solutions to this problem.
We met our first objective by measuring a statistically significant
difference between text alone and text+diagram, but showing that the
practical difference was small (no more than 0.1 points of mean error
as confirmed by an equivalence test).
We incidentally found that subjects were even less accurate than in
our previous experiment, although the reasons for this are unclear. The
design differed in two respects: a) subjects were initially instructed
they could use any tool but they did not have to; b) those who re-
ported having previously seen the HIT without submitting were dis-
carded from the analysis (11%). So subjects might have been primed
in trying to get exact answers and failed in their calculations, or alter-
natively, our previous experiment could have overestimated subjects’
accuracy by including workers who possibly acquainted themselves
with the problem way before carrying out the task.
With respect to our second objective, we tried two alternative pre-
sentations and found that referring to the diagram within the text (V4a)
did not help, whereas removing the actual numbers from the text (V4b)
yielded clear improvements. This is an important finding, since it is a
simple and effective technique that can be easily applied to many real-
life situations. Previously proposed techniques are more difficult to
apply since they either involve prior training, or like active construc-
tions, they require a pen and paper, time and possibly assistance [18].
We do not know of any previous study on Bayesian reasoning which
proposed a technique similar to V4b, possibly due to the fact that most
of them focused on increasing the number of exact answers rather than
reducing estimation errors.
Our particular study focused on how to reduce inaccuracy, exclud-
ing investigations on why exactly subjects make mistakes and what
these mistakes are. Some previous studies have observed different
types of miscalculations in Bayesian reasoning tasks [27] and such
investigations are likely crucial for designing effective visualizations
and text formats. The distributions in Figure 4 do suggest that typical
miscalculations or reasoning errors have occurred in our experiments.
Some of them (close to bias 1) seem less common when a visualization
is provided, possibly resulting in more miscalculations of a different
type (close to bias -1) and a lower bias overall (Figure 5). Trying to
address specific mistakes might help to further increase accuracy, in-
cluding when no numbers are provided, since diagrams can be misin-
terpreted. However, recurrent mistakes seem to vary across problems
(Figure 2) and finding general solutions might be challenging.
Our findings on visualization-friendly textual formats are only an-
other step towards helping people being more accurate in Bayesian
reasoning: even when shown a diagram without numbers, workers
were still inaccurate at estimating probabilities (with a typical esti-
mation about 3 times lower or higher). There are further possible im-
provements to our presentation techniques, such as showing numbers
on the visualization. The text (story) could also be overlaid on the
visualization, or alternatively, miniature visualizations could be em-
bedded in the text [53]. Although we focused on static representations
due to their wider applicability, interactive techniques can not only
help users understand the relationship between text and diagrams, but
also let them explore variants and generalize the problems [54].
Other directions for future work include extending our design space
with other types of Bayesian visualizations and comparing their effi-
ciency. Although our initial comparison was inconclusive, we antici-
pate that using problem formats that are more adapted to visualizations
will encourage subjects to actually use them and will ultimately make
these visualization designs easier to compare in terms of both speed
and estimation accuracy.
6 CONCLUSION
We used crowdsourcing to assess the effect of six visualizations (based
on Euler diagrams, glyphs and combinations of both) on probabilistic
reasoning using three classic Bayesian problems in psychology. Our
findings were inconsistent with previous studies in that subjects’ ac-
curacy was remarkably low and did not significantly improve when a
visualization was provided with the text. A follow-up experiment con-
firmed that simply adding a visualization to a textual Bayesian prob-
lem is of little help for crowdsource workers. It however revealed that
communicating statistical information with a diagram, giving no num-
bers and using text to merely set the scene significantly reduces prob-
ability estimation errors. Thus, novel representations that holistically
combine text and visualizations and that promote the use of estimation
rather than calculation need to be investigated.
We also argue for the need to carry out more studies in settings that
better capture real-life rapid decision making than laboratories. We
propose the use of crowdsourcing to partly address this concern, as
crowdsourcing captures a more diverse and less intensely focused pop-
ulation than university students. Doing so, we hope that appropriate
representations that facilitate reasoning for both laymen and profes-
sionals, independent of their background, knowledge, abilities and age
will be identified. By effectively communicating statistical and prob-
abilistic information, physicians will interpret diagnostic results more
adequately, patients will take more informed decisions when choos-
ing medical treatments, and juries will convict criminals and acquit
innocent defendants more reliably.
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